

17 April 1984

Intelligence

THREAT SUPPORT TO THE WEAPONS SYSTEM ACQUISITION PROCESS

This regulation states Air Force policy for developing, documenting, and validating threat information used in support of the weapons system acquisition process and the planning, programming, and budgeting process. These policies apply to the life cycle of a program, from identification of need through development and acquisition. Validated threat documents support the justification for the initiation and continuation of systems and equipment development, acquisition, and deployment. This regulation implements portions of Department of Defense (DOD) Directive 5000.1, 29 March 1982; and DOD Instruction 5000.2, March 1983, and supports Defense Intelligence (DIA) Regulation 55-3, 9 December 1983.

1. Related Documents:

- a. AFR 57-1, "Statement of Operational Need (SON)," 12 June 1979.
- b. AFR 57-5, "Quick Reaction Capability," 5 August 1981.
- c. AFR 80-14, "Test and Evaluation," 12 September 1980.
- d. AFR 80-38, "Management of the Air Force Survivability Program," 2 August 1982.
- e. AFR 100-45, Vol. I, "Communications Security Policy, Procedures, and Instructions," 22 September 1980.
- f. AFR 800-2, "Acquisition Program Management," 13 August 1982.
- g. AFR 800-3, "Engineering for Defense Systems," 17 June 1977.
- h. HP 21-1, "Department of the Air Force Organization and Functions (Chartbook)," 31 December 1980.
- i. DIAR 55-3, "Threat Support for Major System Acquisitions," 9 December 1983.

2. Policy Statements:

- a. Intelligence support to the Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council/Air Force Systems Acquisition Review Council (DSARC/AFSARC) and budget process must be accomplished in a timely and effective manner. Therefore, DIA, HQ USAF/IN, and the major command (MAJCOM), and separate operating agency (SOA) intelligence activities must work in close cooperation during the entire process.
- b. Threat producers assess and quantify the likelihood that particular aspects of the projected threat will occur.
- c. Assessments are produced at the lowest possible classification consistent with user needs and security considerations.
- d. Threat assessments are long-range estimates covering the expected life cycle of the proposed system. They are produced to support the weapons system acquisition, planning, programming, and budgeting process, as differentiated from data

or documents used to support current peacetime or combat operational requirements.

3. Mission Area Analysis (MAA):

- a. The US Air Force uses the Air Force-Wide Mission Area Analysis (AFWMAA) to help make resource allocation decisions, using long-range planning and need identification, in accordance with the Congressional Budget Act of 1974. The major goal of AFWMAA is to provide a visible, traceable, analytic thread from mission capability needs through to the enacted Air Force budget, which is displayed and defended by mission areas.
- b. AFWMAA methodology categorizes US Air Force functions and responsibilities by mission area, the importance of each mission area, and US Air Force's ability to perform it.
- c. AFWMAA results are summarized in the Air Force Planning Guide (AFPG) which documents US Air Force needs in terms of national and mission objectives, as well as US Air Force characteristics, functions, tasks, and projected enemy threat trends.
- d. AFWMAA results form the basis for the weapons system acquisition process. These results may provide rationale for associated documents, such as Statements of Operational Need (SONs) and Justifications for Major System New Start (JMSNS).

4. HQ USAF/IN Support to AFWMAA:

- a. HQ USAF/IN provides threat data used to assess US Air Force's capabilities to perform its assigned missions. The threat impacts on the importance assigned to the functions and tasks within each mission area. AFWMAA conclusions identify and set priorities for mission capabilities which require maintenance or enhancement.
- b. HQ USAF/IN has these responsibilities in providing threat data:
 - (1) Review and comment on HQ USAF/XOX-proposed scenarios which are based on the Defense Guidance, the Joint Strategic Planning Document, the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, and other relevant planning considerations.
 - (2) Provide intelligence on the quality and extent of enemy capabilities that support agreed on scenarios. Enemy trends are highlighted at 5-year intervals out to 15 years beyond the program year that the AFWMAA cycle supports.

No. of Printed Pages: 3

OPR: INEG (Maj N. Gustafson)

Approved by: Col Richard J. O'Lear

Writer-Editor: Barbara Carver

Distribution: F

(3) Ensure the proper application of threat information within mission logic trees.

c. In supporting HQ USAF/XOX generation of AFWMAA scenarios, HQ USAF/IN provides:

- (1) Enemy doctrine and objectives;
- (2) Enemy force structure and order of battle likely to be involved;
- (3) Likely enemy strategy and employment tactics.

5. Need-Identification Stage Process:

a. The MAJCOM or SOA analyzes its assigned missions to determine its ability to successfully perform the tasks and functions required to achieve mission objectives. Deficiencies are identified in the form of SONs and Quick Reaction Capabilities (QRCs).

(1) A SON identifies a specific perceived operational deficiency or need, ordinarily is originated by a MAJCOM or SOA, and is submitted per AFR 57-1. Occasionally, a SON is developed by HQ USAF, at which time HQ USAF/INEG provides threat rationale or constraints if required.

(2) A QRC is similar to a SON, but stresses the necessity of expeditious, threat-driven change.

b. Defining the Threat:

(1) Threat matters are addressed and structured per AFR 57-1. If threat is the basis of need of the SON, a brief description is included.

(2) Additionally, a description of the threat environment in which the resulting or solution system is likely to operate (to include the projected threat for the entire life cycle of the system) is required. AFR 57-5 provides guidance for QRC threat preparation.

(3) Intelligence data approved by HQ USAF/IN, DIA, and other members of the national level Intelligence Community is used. Incorporation of original analysis and conclusions and acquisition of information from other sources is not discouraged; however, HQ USAF/IN review and validation still is required.

(a) When threat data is either the basis of need or described as a constraint, Intelligence Community addressees (as specified in AFR 57-1) review the draft SON and respond to the originator within 30 calendar days of receipt of the SON. HQ USAF/INE reviews and consolidates appropriate Air Staff comments and responds to the originator within 45 calendar days of receipt of the initial draft SON. To determine if the threat assessment has been appropriately tailored to the perceived need, the draft or final SON, in its entirety only, is accepted for review.

(b) Every effort is made to provide the threat data at the lowest possible security level consistent with user needs. If inclusion of sensitive compartmented information (SCI) is warranted for assessment of the threat, the document is handled per USAFINTEL 201-1.

6. Need-Evaluation Stage Process:

a. HQ USAF/RDQM, as the air staff OPR for final SON validation, distributes copies to action addressees on the Air

Staff. HQ USAF/INEG reviews, coordinates, and validates threat sections of the SON. The final response is provided to the originator within 60 calendar days of receipt (with a copy to HQ USAF/RDQM).

b. Once the final SON is presented for validation, the HQ USAF/INEG representative reevaluates it, affirming its adequacy from the threat perspective. If it has been determined the threat section of the document is inadequate for any reason, it is reaccomplished by the originator in close coordination with HQ USAF/INEG.

c. If a solution for a validated need indicates a major system acquisition program or Air Force Designated Acquisition Program (AFDAP) may result, a JMSNS is prepared. HQ USAF/INEG provides a threat assessment summary if required. The Air Force OPR then forwards a "for comment" draft of the JMSNS, including the threat assessment, to DIA for comment before the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) submission in sufficient time to allow for validation.

d. Once a final SON/QRC is validated by the Requirements Review Group (RRG), it is authorized to compete for funding.

e. After funds are identified, the Program Element Monitor (PEM) issues a Program Management Directive (PMD) to the implementing operating, test and evaluation, and other participating commands. The PMD establishes specific responsibility for the development of a system solution to the SON and begins the conceptual phase. It provides direction regarding responsibility and timeliness of threat-assessment preparation, and establishes procedures for threat support which make maximum use of available resources and is responsive to user needs. During the PMD preparation process the PEM is required to coordinate the draft with HQ USAF/INEG to ensure the implementing command (usually Air Force Systems Command (AFSC)) is properly tasked to provide threat documentation to support the program.

(1) The following statement, or one similar to it, should be included in PMDs for major systems under program direction, to the implementing command:

Intelligence/Threat Estimate:

Provide threat data for this program as required by AFR 200-13. The implementing command will complete, or update, a System Threat Assessment Report, or other threat documentation, and obtain HQ USAF/IN approval in advance of each program milestone.

NOTE: Those systems not threat-driven or not programmed to operate in a threat environment require no threat description.

(2) The implementing command may establish a threat working group to act as an advisory body on threat matters. This group should include the required expertise from Intelligence Community organizations and representatives from the operating, participating, and supporting commands.

(3) The implementing command may establish an ad hoc steering group as defined in DIAR 55-3 for joint service programs or for programs requiring extraordinarily complex or urgent threat-assessment development.

7. Program Milestone Review. Throughout the entire system development and testing process intelligence support must be

provided as requested by individual System Program Offices. Informal support is further enhanced by formal products.

a. System Threat Assessment Report (STAR):

(1) A STAR is prepared and updated as necessary in advance of each program milestone for a DSARC program. It is prepared by the implementing command according to formats and descriptions outlined in DIAR 55-3.

(2) The STAR describes threat systems against which the proposed US system will operate, and the hostile lethal and nonlethal threat environment in which it will operate. Threat information is projected for threat at Initial Operational Capability (IOC) and IOC+10 years. Integration of data on projected force levels, technical characteristics, and capabilities of individual systems and their tactics are required. Threat data must be current to 1 year of each milestone.

(3) During the review and validation of each iteration of the STAR, the originating office forwards copies to its parent organization, AFSC Foreign Technology Division (FTD), and other agencies if required, for review and comment. Two information copies are sent to HQ USAF/INEG. Within 30 calendar days of receipt, the parent organization consolidates comments and forwards them and three additional copies of the STAR to HQ USAF/INEG. This office consolidates Air Staff and sister Service comments on the document and responds to the originator through its parent organization within 45 calendar days of receipt of parent organization-consolidated comments.

(4) When comments are incorporated into the document by the originator, a second revision of the STAR is forwarded through the review cycle again. Once it has been determined the changes have been incorporated, HQ USAF/INEG forwards the STAR in four copies to DIA for validation. Any DIA comments are forwarded to the originator for inclusion.

(5) Once DIA validation has been secured, the office originating the document inserts the validation statement in the preface of the document according to DIAR 55-3.

(6) As the description of the projected US system becomes more detailed, so the threat description must be correspondingly refined.

b. Threat Assessment Report (TAR). Identical to a STAR in content and format, the TAR is required for AFSARC programs and is reviewed and validated up through HQ USAF/INEG.

c. System Concept Paper (SCP). The SCP summarizes the results of the exploration phase to Milestone I. The threat assessment section is prepared by HQ USAF/INEG per AFR 800-2 and forwarded to DIA for validation.

d. Decision Coordinating Paper/Integrated Program Summary (DCP/IPS):

(1) The DCP/IPS is updated to reflect changes since Milestone II if Milestone III is required, and provides different levels of detail for consideration by the DSARC.

(2) The DCP is a top-level summary document identifying alternatives and thresholds.

(3) The IPS provides more specific information with respect to the program when it has been determined the DCP contains insufficient information on which to base the requisite decision and contains basic threat documentation.

(4) HQ USAF/INEG prepares and forwards IPS threat section to DIA for validation.

e. Threat Planning Document (TPD). For those programs not qualifying as major (AFSARC or DSARC), but requiring threat support, a TPD is prepared by the implementing command. The TPD describes the intelligence provided to support the program. When existing intelligence does not meet the program needs, the TPD expands those elements of the Threat Environment Description (TED) which are peculiar to the particular system (for example, known threat). This document may include reactive threat and Critical Intelligence Parameters (CIPs). The TPD is accomplished within 1 year of the publication date of the PMD.

f. Threat Environment Description (TED). A TED is a baseline reference document for further development of threat data in support of specific weapon systems and acquisition of generic technologies or systems. It encompasses a broad area of concern, such as space, tactical or strategic systems, or electromagnetic combat.

(1) TEDs are used to develop:

- (a) STARs/TARs.
- (b) Inputs to the MAA.
- (c) Threat scenarios.
- (d) Threat summaries for SONs.
- (e) TPDs.

(2) AFSC produces TEDs and establishes a schedule for their update.

After Program Management Responsibility Transfer (PMRT), and for the remainder of the life cycle of the system, the responsibility for providing updated threat data belongs to the operating command. However, parametric data from certain electromagnetic data bases (such as the Electronic Warfare Integrated Reprogrammable (EWIR)) must continue to be provided after PMRT to Air Force Logistics Command for distribution to its air logistics centers. MAJCOMs and SOAs are authorized to request this data from HQ USAF/INW, with a copy of the request to AFSC/FTD(TQIV).

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE

OFFICIAL

CHARLES A. GABRIEL, General, USAF
Chief of Staff

JAMES H. DELANEY, Colonel, USAF
Director of Administration